View source for Prefaces, no date (1604), by Heinrich Nollius (BP.Nollius.1604-01)

{{InfoboxParatext
| Author=Heinrich Nollius
| Recipient=
| Type=Prefaces
| Date=0
| DatePresumed=1604
| Place=
| Pages=
| Language=lat
| Editor=Julian Paulus
| SourceTitle=Prodromi logici tractatus tres
| SourceAuthor=Heinrich Nollius
| SourcePlace=Hanau: Wilhelm Antonius
| SourceDate=1604
| SourceBP=BP.Nollius.1604-01
| SourcePag=
| Translation=1
| AbstractGPT=In the first preface, Nollius discusses the concept of 'art', noting its widespread recognition among both philosophers and the general populace. He observes that despite its common usage, the true nature of art has not been thoroughly explained. Nollius aims to delve deeper into the nature of art, distinguishing between principles of being and principles of knowing. He proposes a definition of art as a method of transforming something into a different use for human life. His goal is to clarify and expand the understanding of art through detailed exploration of its underlying principles. </br> In the seconde preface, Nollius reflects on his intellectual journey, particularly his engagement with the doctrines of Ramus in logic during his youth. He describes how his initial support for Ramist logic was challenged by exposure to Peripatetic philosophy and the works of other logicians like Keckermann. This led him to a deeper understanding and appreciation of Peripatetic logic. Nollius's narrative illustrates his evolving perspective on logic, highlighting his critical examination of different schools of thought and his eventual shift away from Ramist logic, driven by a quest for a more substantial logical foundation. </br> In the third preface, Nollius addresses the reader's potential surprise at his audacity to write about the complex art of logic as a young man. He shares his initial hesitation and his motivation to contribute to the field, driven by the challenges and needs of beginners in logic. Nollius emphasizes his commitment to making logic more accessible and understandable, particularly for those struggling with Ramist Logic. He outlines his intention to present a clear and concise overview of logic, aiming to inspire and guide beginners towards a deeper appreciation and understanding of the subject.
}}

{{Pagemark|pag|11}} {{MarkupUppercase|Pr&aelig;fatio in tractatum primum.|u=v}}

{{MarkupInitial|Artis}} vocabulum magno in vsu esse cernimus, ita vt etiam videatur non Philosophis tantum, sed etiam plebi rudiori eius vocabuli vis nota & plana. Verum hactenus <i>artis</i> naturam perspicuè & absolutissimè declaratam esse abs quopiam non animaduertimus. Quare nos oper&aelig;pretium facturos putamus, si paulo expeditius & pensiculatius artis naturam inquiramus: atque, quid sit ars, verè detegamus in certis principiis, per qu&aelig; profundius ars exploretur, & cognoscatur. Notandum autem est, duplicia esse principia vnius rei: principia enim sunt vel principia essendi, vel principia cognoscendi. <i>Principia essendi</i> sunt, à quibus & è quibus res aliqua fit, & oritur. H&aelig;c principia vocantur {{Pagemark|pag|12}} aliâs <i>caus&aelig; efficientes, & materiales.</i> Principia cognoscendi sunt, per qu&aelig; vnius rei natura perfecti{{EditAbbr|us}} & peniti{{EditAbbr|us}} declaratur, & percipitur. H{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}c principia dicu{{EditAbbr|n}}tur ideo principia cognitionis, quia faciu{{EditAbbr|n}}t, vt res, quaru{{EditAbbr|m}} principia esse dicuntur, eo melius & facilius intelliga{{EditAbbr|n}}tur, & cognosca{{EditAbbr|n}}tur. H{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}} principia nihil aliud sunt, qua{{EditAbbr|m}} axiomata rei, qua{{EditAbbr|m}} declarant, supposita, vt per eoru{{EditAbbr|m}} expositione{{EditAbbr|m}} & enucleatione{{EditAbbr|m}} res {{EditAbbr|pro}}posita in alioru{{EditAbbr|m}} cognitione{{EditAbbr|m}} citius & clari{{EditAbbr|us}} inuehatur. Quare nos, vt artis natura{{EditAbbr|m}} & vim aliis eò facilius aperiamus, principia perqu{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}} ars exactius apprehe{{EditAbbr|n}}datur, artis definitioni subiecimus, atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} arte{{EditAbbr|m}} in iis, qua{{EditAbbr|n}}tu{{EditAbbr|m}}visum est necessariu{{EditAbbr|m}}, illustrauimus. Quod vt benè accipias, atque vtiliter nostrâ operâ fruaris, petimus. Nos damus hanc artis definitionem:

: <i>Ars est certus modus rem ineptam dirigendi ad human&aelig; vit&aelig; alium vsum.</i>

<hr>

{{Pagemark|pag|28}} {{MarkupUppercase|Tractatus secundus. Pr&aelig;fatio.|u=v}}

<i>De occasione, qua factum est, vt autor Rami dogmata deseruerit.</i>

{{MarkupInitial|Anno}} &aelig;tatis me&aelig; decimo nono, vbi priuatis disputationibus me immiscui, c&oelig;pi ex Dei gratia & auxilio singulariter de logicis pr&aelig;ceptis cogitare, atque ea, quantum tulit me{{EditAbbr|n}}s mea, mecum perpendere in eum finem, vt haberem aliquid, quod in honorem meoru{{EditAbbr|m}} condiscipulorum themata proponentium proferrem. Itaque etiam animum meum, cùm condiscipuli Ramum defenderent, thesesque pro Ramo pr&aelig;ceptor noster pr{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}legeret, diligentius appuli ad obiecta communicanda, atque incommunem nostri collegii vtilitatem proponenda, quo eorum veram solutionem, quam ipsemet inuenire nequiui, vel a condiscipulis, vel à pr&aelig;side exciperem. Sed obiectorum meorum deletio vbi data est, interdum coactus fui ob ingenii {{Pagemark|pag|29}} mei tum temporis angustiam solutioni relat&aelig; acquiescere. Interim tamen resalutans limina musei mei, nondesii responsionem datam meditari, quam igitur volui atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} reuolui, vt veritatem ipsam rimari & certius fundamentum in logica iácere possem. Licet ita rem rimatus fuerim, tamen sensi meum immaturum de logicis rebus iudicium, atque intellige{{EditAbbr|n}}tiam imperfectam: Vnde s&aelig;pè volui me ex iis cogitationibus extricare, atque eas aliô co{{EditAbbr|n}}uertere; verum vbi hoc ausus fui, statim pr&aelig;ter meam voluntatem de logica singularia cogitata redierunt, vnumque ex altero considerato incidit, quo factum est, vt in posterum diligentiam maiorem in studiis Dialecticis collocarem. Quare vbi in priuato collegio audiui logicam esse rationis artem, Rame{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}} Logices definitio maxime displicuit; siquidem in ea videre nequiui, Dialecticam Rameam rationi primario conferre: Vnde tandem ipse de alia Logices definitione cogitationem suscepi. Hinc vt artis natura mihi accuratius innotesceret, iuuit Deus animum per inspectionem directam in artes mechanicas, vbi obseruaui omnis artis finem esse, docere modum agendi in obiectum aliquod corrigendum. Logicam artem esse sciui: pro Logices obiectum tum habui rationem, tanquam eam, qu{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}} per lapsum tenebris inuoluta Dei auxilio ad lucem cognitionis per logicam reducenda sit: Hinc {{Pagemark|pag|30}} hanc definitionem dedi: <i>Logica est ars corrigendi rationem</i>. Et si verò h&aelig;c de Logica habuerim, à Ramo ta{{EditAbbr|m}} pr&aelig;cipitanter desciscere nolui, putans Ramum etiam defensari posse: Quare ad tempus subticui. Tandem vbi quida{{EditAbbr|m}} studiosi me co{{EditAbbr|n}}uenerunt, ii summis laudibus peripatetica{{EditAbbr|m}} philosophia{{EditAbbr|m}} & Peripateticorum logica dogmata euexeru{{EditAbbr|n}}t, atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} in iis maiore{{EditAbbr|m}} succum co{{EditAbbr|n}}tineri qua{{EditAbbr|m}} in Rami co{{EditAbbr|m}}me{{EditAbbr|n}}tis Dialecticis dixerunt. Ego h{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}c audiens, illorum sermone{{EditAbbr|m}} pro nihilo duxi, siquide{{EditAbbr|m}} existimaui, Peripateticorum logica systemata nimis esse longa, laboriosa operâ percurii & inuestigari oportere, quare non ita facile à Ramo discedendum iudicaui. Oblatum interim est iudicium Peripateticoru{{EditAbbr|m}} de Rami Logicis pr{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}ceptis: Hoc pro immaturo, quale & meum esse opinatus fui, aspiciens mea{{EditAbbr|m}} {{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}tate{{EditAbbr|m}}, habui. Intereâ verò du{{EditAbbr|m}} in his luctis vertabat, ad amicum que{{EditAbbr|n}}dam meum veni, apud que{{EditAbbr|m}} Pr&aelig;cognita Logica Keckermanni doctissimi Logici reperi, in quib{{EditAbbr|us}}, vbi statim vnum atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} alterum folium perlegi, dulcescere inc&oelig;pit Peripateticu{{EditAbbr|m}} de Logica institutu{{EditAbbr|m}}. Si quide{{EditAbbr|m}} in ipsis Pr{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}cognitis offendi illud, quod â mea de definitione Logices sententia non alienum esset: Ait {{EditAbbr|enim}} ipse Keckerma{{EditAbbr|n}}nus in altera pagina pr{{EditAbbr|&aelig;}}fationis, intellectum à Logica primario dirigi. Quid grati{{EditAbbr|us}} mihi occurrere potuit? Inde c&oelig;pi profundius re{{EditAbbr|m}} ponderare atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} pl{{EditAbbr|us}} qua{{EditAbbr|m}} anteà Peripateticis tribuere. {{Pagemark|pag|31}} Eos deinde fideliter lectione perstrinxi: Si quid obseruatu dignum existimauerim, singulariter annotaui, atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} meum fundamentu{{EditAbbr|m}} in Peripatetica Logica, quaten{{EditAbbr|us}} ex Dei gratia haurire potuerim, posui, nec tamen à Ramo penitus me abiunxi, Ramea & Peripatetica dogmata co{{EditAbbr|n}}tuli, & de vtrisq{{EditAbbr|ue}} iudiciu{{EditAbbr|m}} meu{{EditAbbr|m}} habui: Hinc id factum est, vt quò anteâ firmius ad Rameam Logica{{EditAbbr|m}} adh&aelig;rescere voluerim, eò longius postea à Rami Logica assertione discesserim. No{{EditAbbr|n}} leuia me co{{EditAbbr|m}}mouerunt fundamenta. Pr&aelig;cipuorum adumbrationem in quibusdam exercitationibus subnecta{{EditAbbr|m}}, quo lector candidus ex his perspiciat quid de Rami Logica sentiendum sit.

<hr>

{{Pagemark|pag|149}} {{MarkupUppercase|Tractatus tertius.|u=v}} {{MarkupSmallcaps|Pr&aelig;fatio ad}} lectorem.

{{MarkupInitial|Demiraris|Smallcaps=1}} <i>forsan humane lector, institutum meum. Admiraris conatum meum, qui iuuenis ausim conscribere difficilima{{EditAbbr|m}} illa{{EditAbbr|m}} arte{{EditAbbr|m}} logicam, imò artem eam, qu&aelig; à viro plurimorum annorum edi digna sit. Video hoc ipse s&aelig;pè. Ideò à decreto meo desistere & alterius doctioris quidem ingenio illud committere volui. Verum licèt à meo proposito ita per me abstractus fuerim, tamen retractus sum ad illud per Tyrones, qui vel de difficultate Rame&aelig; Logices conquerantur, vel eam, tanquam verissimam & plenissimam accipiant. Studui itaque Logicam per Dei auxilium & gratiam: maiore{{EditAbbr|m}} eam artem diligentiam adhibui, & tandem ex Dei singulari gratiâ voti mei compos factus sum, & inueni ratione{{EditAbbr|m}} & viam, qua è difficultate & obscuritate Rame&aelig; Logices {{Pagemark|pag|150}} eripi studiosi queant. Hanc viam iam in commune expositurus sum; non quidem, vt aliorum doctorum molimina & opera neglecta velim; sed vt iis & h&aelig;c mea adiicia{{EditAbbr|n}}t; atq{{EditAbbr|ue}} ita ex meis & illorum eruditorum laborib[us] aliquid sibi acquirant, quod ad progreßum studiorum faciat. Antequam vero </i>Institutiones logicas<i> luci prostituam co{{EditAbbr|m}}muni, adumbrationem quandam earum pr&aelig;mittere ad studiosos inte{{EditAbbr|n}}di, quo co{{EditAbbr|m}}pendiosius intelligant, quantu{{EditAbbr|m}} vtilitatis hoc meu{{EditAbbr|m}} opus ipsis offerre possit. Quonia{{EditAbbr|m}} aut{{EditAbbr|em}} vnusquisq{{EditAbbr|ue}} artifex, antequa{{EditAbbr|m}} discipulu{{EditAbbr|m}} suu{{EditAbbr|m}} in penetralib[us] artis su&aelig; erudiat, solet finem artis discipulo ignoranti optimè inculcare, quô eô arde{{EditAbbr|n}}tius ad artis bonum acq{{EditAbbr|ui}}re{{EditAbbr|n}}dum excitetur, & ita alacrior ad opera{{EditAbbr|n}}du{{EditAbbr|m}} reddatur. Ita etia{{EditAbbr|m}} ego in hoc laborabo, vt finem ipsius Logices antea logico tyroni fideliter & dilucidissimè per quasda{{EditAbbr|m}} ad qu&aelig;stiones respo{{EditAbbr|n}}siones pr&aelig;scribam, quo veri boni cognitione in logicam vehementiori desiderio moueatur. Tande{{EditAbbr|m}} ego tanqua{{EditAbbr|m}} in breuissima tabella </i>Institutiones logicas<i> lectori oste{{EditAbbr|n}}dam, vt paucis videat, quid Logica sit, & in quibus illa consistat. Sic itaq{{EditAbbr|ue}} incipiam.</i>

{{InfoboxTranslation|Date=2023-12-31|Model=4}}

<b>Preface to the First Treatise</b>

In the term 'art', we see a word of great usage, so much so that it seems not only philosophers but also the common people are familiar with its meaning and essence. However, to date, we have not noticed anyone who has clearly and completely explained the nature of art. Therefore, we think it worthwhile to inquire more thoroughly and meticulously into the nature of art: to truly uncover what art is, based on certain principles that allow for a deeper exploration and understanding of it. It should be noted that there are two types of principles for anything: principles of being and principles of knowing. Principles of being are those from which and by which something is made and arises. These are otherwise known as efficient and material causes. Principles of knowing are those through which the nature of something is more perfectly and deeply declared and perceived. These principles are called principles of knowledge because they make the things, which are said to be their principles, better and more easily understood and known. These principles are nothing else but the axioms of the thing they declare, assumed so that through their exposition and elucidation the proposed matter is more quickly and clearly brought into the knowledge of others. Therefore, to make the nature and power of art easier for others to understand, we have subjected the principles through which art is more precisely apprehended to the definition of art, and have illustrated art in them as much as seemed necessary. We ask that you receive this well and use our work beneficially. We give this definition of art:

: Art is a certain method of directing a clumsy thing to another use in human life.

<b>Preface to the Second Treatise</b>

: On the occasion that led to the author abandoning the doctrines of Ramus.

In my nineteenth year, when I began to engage in private disputes, I started to think about logical precepts with God's grace and singular help, and to weigh them as far as my mind allowed, so that I might have something to present in honor of my fellow students who proposed themes. Thus, when my classmates defended Ramus and our teacher lectured on theses for Ramus, I applied myself more diligently to sharing objections and proposing them for the common benefit of our college, so that I might receive their true solution, which I myself could not find, either from classmates or from the president. But when my objections were dismissed, I was sometimes forced to accept the given solution due to the narrowness of my mind at that time. Meanwhile, returning to the threshold of my study, I did not cease to meditate on the given response, which I then wanted to turn over and over, to search for the truth itself and lay a surer foundation in logic. Although I investigated the matter in this way, I still felt my immature judgment about logical matters and imperfect understanding. Hence, I often wanted to extricate myself from these thoughts and turn them elsewhere; but when I dared to do this, thoughts about logic immediately returned against my will, and one consideration led to another, which made me later place greater diligence in Dialectical studies. Therefore, when I heard in a private college that logic is the art of reason, Ramus's definition of Logic greatly displeased me; for in it, I could not see that Ramist Dialectic primarily contributes to reason: Hence I myself began to think of another definition of Logic. Thus, as the nature of art became more clearly known to me, God helped my mind through direct inspection of the mechanical arts, where I observed that the end of every art is to teach the way of acting upon some object to be corrected. I knew Logic to be an art: for the object of Logic, I then considered reason, as that which, enveloped in darkness by a fall, is to be brought back to the light of knowledge through logic with God's help: Hence I gave this definition: Logic is the art of correcting reason. And if I truly held this about Logic, I did not want to desert Ramus so precipitously, thinking that Ramus could also be defended: Therefore, I kept silent for a time. Eventually, when some students approached me, they highly praised Peripatetic philosophy and the logical doctrines of the Peripatetics, and said that they contained more substance than Ramus's Dialectical comments. Hearing this, I considered their talk worthless, as I thought that the logical systems of the Peripatetics were too long and laborious to run through and investigate, so I did not judge it so easy to leave Ramus. Meanwhile, the judgment of the Peripatetics on Ramus's Logical precepts was offered: I considered this immature, as I thought mine to be, considering my age. However, while struggling with these thoughts, I came to a friend of mine, at whose place I found the 'Logical Precognitions' of Keckermann, the most learned Logician, in which, as soon as I read one and another leaf, the Peripatetic institution about Logic began to appeal to me. For in the Precognitions themselves, I encountered that which was not alien to my sentiment about the definition of Logic: For Keckermann himself says on the second page of the preface that the intellect is primarily directed by Logic. What could have occurred more pleasingly to me? From there I began to ponder the matter more deeply and to attribute more than before to the Peripatetics. [p. 31] I then faithfully read through them: Whatever I deemed worthy of observation, I noted down particularly, and laid my foundation in Peripatetic Logic, as far as I could draw from God's grace, and yet I did not completely turn away from Ramus, I compared Ramist and Peripatetic doctrines, and had my judgment about both: Hence it happened that the more firmly I wanted to adhere to Ramist Logic before, the further I later moved away from Ramus's assertion of Logic. Not insignificant foundations moved me. I will attach an outline of the main points in some exercises, so that the candid reader may see from these what is to be thought of Ramus's Logic.

<b>Preface to the Third Treatise: To the Reader.</b>

You may wonder, kind reader, at my undertaking. You admire my effort, that I, a young man, dare to write about that most difficult art of logic, indeed, an art that seems worthy to be produced by a man of many years. I often see this myself. Therefore, I wanted to desist from my decision and entrust it to the genius of someone more learned. However, although I was thus distracted from my purpose by myself, I was nevertheless drawn back to it by beginners, who either complain about the difficulty of Ramist Logic or accept it as the most true and complete. Therefore, I have studied Logic with the help of God and His grace: I applied greater diligence to this art, and finally, by God's singular grace, I achieved my wish and found a method and way by which students can be rescued from the difficulty and obscurity of Ramist Logic [p. 150]. I am now going to set forth this method for the common good; not, indeed, that I wish to neglect the efforts and works of other learned men, but that they might add these my efforts to theirs; and so from my labors and those of other scholars, they might acquire something that contributes to the progress of their studies. However, before I expose my logical institutions to the common light, I intended to present a certain sketch of them to students, so that they might more briefly understand how much usefulness this my work can offer them. Since every craftsman, before he educates his student in the inner sanctums of his art, usually impresses upon the ignorant disciple the end of the art most excellently, so that he may be more ardently excited to acquire the good of the art, and thus be made more eager to work. So also, I will endeavor to prescribe the end of Logic itself beforehand to the logical beginner faithfully and most clearly through certain responses to questions, so that he may be moved by the knowledge of the true good to a more vehement desire for logic. Finally, I will show the logical institutions to the reader as if in a very brief tablet, so that in a few words he sees what Logic is and in what it consists. Thus, I shall begin.